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must be remembered that the degree of care required by an infant of
tender years is not to be confused with that required by an adult, but
is to be measured by the maturity and capacity of the individual. 5
The conduct of a child of tender years is judged by the standard of
behavior one would expect from a child of like age, intelligence, and
experience. 6
But if the care required of a child is to be measured by such
considerations as its maturity, capacity, discretion, and knowledge,
there must, of course, be an age at which no care can be required of
a child, an age at which the doctrine of contributory negligence can
have no application. In Jacobs v. Koehler Sporting Goods Co., 7 the
court held that an infant may be of such tender years as to be incapable of personal negligence and at such age the infant is termed
non sid juris. In the case of very young children, one or two years
old, the question seldom arises, but as we progress above those ages,
there are so many conflicting decisions as to make futile any attempt
to set the age of which it can be said that the conclusive presumption
of incapacity ceases.
D.L.

PARENT AND CHILD-PARENT'S LIABILITY FOR LEGAL SERVICES
FURNISHED THE CHILD-RIGHT OF CLIENT TO DISCHARGE ATTORNEY.-Defendant's seventeen year old daughter was indicted on
criminal charges. Defendant retained an attorney to defend his
daughter. There was some evidence to indicate that the attorney
hired by the defendant did not take all necessary precautions for
the protection of his client. The daughter, prior to the termination
of the criminal proceedings against her, discharged the attorney secured by the defendant and retained counsel of her own choice. This
second attorney is the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff predicates his action for the recovery of the value of his professional services upon an implied promise on the part of the defendant to pay
for necessaries furnished to his infant daughter. At the close of a
jury trial the Municipal Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on
its merits, holding that as a matter of law the defendant had furMarfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 179 Ati. 9 (1935)
(age, experience and judgment) ; Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., 99 Mont. 372,
43 P. (2d) 896 (1935) (experience, intelligence and capability); Davis v.
Bailey, 162 Okla. 86, 19 P. (2d) 147 (1933) (intelligence, experience, discre-

tion, previous training, maturity, alertness, and nature of danger encountered) ;

Camardo v. New York State Ry., 247 N. Y. 111, 159 N. E. 879 (1928) (age
and capacity); see PRossER o1m TORTS (1941) §36, HARPER, THaE LAW OF
ToRTs (1933) § 141.
5Finkelstein v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R. R., 41 Hun 34, 40 (1886).
6 REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 283.
7208 N. Y. 416, 102 N. E. 519 (1913).
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nished suitable legal aid to his daughter. Held, decision reversed
and new trial ordered. It was error to decide as a matter of law
that the defendant had furnished suitable legal services for his daughter. This was an issue of fact which should have been submitted to
the jury. Griston v. Stousland, 186 Misc. 201, 60 N. Y. S. (2d)
118 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
The Appellate Term, in reviewing basic principles involving the
parent and child relationship, determined that legal services furnished
to an infant at her own request in connection with a criminal prosecution were in the nature of necessaries, for which the parent, under
proper conditions, could be held liable.
The liability of a father to furnish necessaries for his minor
child depends on principles analogous to a husband's duty to supply
his wife with necessaries.1 Legal services under the circumstances
of this case were compared, as to the matter of necessity, with medical services supplied to the child, in times of ill health.2 However,
to hold the parent liable for such services, it is insufficient to show
that the services supplied were in fact necessaries. In addition, it
must be shown that the parent neglected to provide the infant with
the proper, necessary services.3 Therein lies a point of difficulty in
this case. As a general rule the court respects the right of the parent
to supervise the upbringing of his children. While the parent's right
in this regard is not absolute, the courts will not intervene until it
is shown that the parent's actions were cruel and arbitrary to the
extent of impairing the health or well-being of his offspring. 4 Therefore, as the court points out, a parent may not be held liable for
necessaries furnished by a third party at the request of the child
where the parent has in fact provided the child with such necessaries
and the child, through mere whim or caprice, refuses to make use
thereof. 5 It is proper then to consider whether the plaintiff's legal
services were rendered under such conditions as to make the defendant parent in this action legally responsible for them.
It is the unquestionable right of the defendant in a civil or
criminal action to discharge her attorney. 6 However, where the defendant is a minor and the parent has provided an attorney for her
defense, the exercise by the minor of her absolute right to discharge
that attorney does not in and of itself make the parent responsible
for legal services rendered to the child by an attorney of her own
choice. Consequently, in order to render the father liable it must
be shown that he neglected to supply his daughter with suitable legal
counsel. To a great extent the competency of the attorney retained
I Cromwell

v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558 (N. Y. 1863).
Elder v. Rosenwasser, 238 N. Y. 427, 144 N. E. 669 (1924).
Loucks v. Dutcher, 112 N. Y. Supp. 269 (County Ct. 1908).
4 Tirrell v. Tirrell, 232 N. Y. 224, 133 N. E. 569 (1921).
56 Loucks v. Dutcher, 112 N. Y. Supp. 269 (County Ct. 1908).
Robinson v. Rogers, 237 N. Y. 467, 143 N. E. 647 (1924).
2
3
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by the parent for the defense of his child would determine whether
or not the parent had furnished adequate legal counsel.
In reviewing the proceedings of this action in the lower court
it seemed apparent to the learned justices of the Appellate Term
that there might have been a justification for the child's action in dismissing the attorney selected by her father, and that the circumstances surrounding that dismissal should have been permitted to be
fully inquired into at the trial. The court pointed out that it was
error to determine as a matter of law that the defendant had provided competent legal services for his seventeen year old daughter.
Generally, where the question arises as to whether the parent
neglected to furnish suitable necessaries for his infant
children it is
7
for the jury to arrive at the answer from the facts.
C.

J. B.

JR.

REAL PROPERTY-DAMAGE BY F IRE-SPEcIFIc PERFORMANCE
WITH ABATEMENT-VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK AcT.-The

plaintiff, the assignee of the purchaser, brought suit in equity for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of realty with an
abatement for the partial destruction of the improvements caused
by fire which occurred between the date of signing of the contract
and the law day. The vendor had refused to convey on these terms
on the closing date, but instead, tendered the deed and demanded
the full purchase price. Upon rejection by the vendee, the vendor
made a second offer, namely, to return the down payment and pay
the cost of the title search. The vendee rejected this proposal and
reiterated his demand for the deed with an abatement for loss. The
vendor had collected the insurance which amply covered the loss.
At the trial, the defendant asserted the rights of the parties were
determined by the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act 1 and
insisted that his second offer was made in compliance with the statute.
The plaintiff contended that the statute was precluded from having
effect by the following provisions of the contract of sale: "In the
event for any reason the Seller is unable to cause to be conveyed
7 Stevens v. Hush, 107 Misc. 353, 176 N. Y. Supp. 602 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
1 N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 240-a. "Uniform vendor and purchaser
risk act. 1. Any contract hereafter made for the purchase and sale or exchange of realty shall be interpreted, unless the contract expressly provides
otherwise, as including an agreement that the parties shall have the following

rights and duties:
(a) When neither the legal title nor the possession of the subject matter
of the contract has been transferred to the purchaser: (1) if all or a material
part thereof is destroyed without fault of the purchaser . . . , the vendor cannot enforce the contract, and the purchaser is entitled to recover any portion
of the price that he has paid; . . ."

(Italics supplied.)

